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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRANK A.

LANGHEINRICH,

Appellant-Defendant,
vs.
Appeal No. 20171

WILSON-DAVIS, & CO., INC.,
a Utah Corporation,
Respondent-Plaintiff.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT - DEFENDANT
Appellant-Defendant Frank Langheinrich ("Langheinrich"), an
individual, files this Reply Brief to Respondent-Plaintiff's
Brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In its brief, respondent-plaintiff, Wilson-Davis & Co.,
Inc., (''Wilson"), a Utah Corporation, recites facts pertaining
to the signing of a check drawn on the account of Langheinrich &
Fender, Inc. ("L&F") payable to Wilson and signed by
Langheinrich, as the only material facts. Wilson claims that
all other facts are immaterial.
Langheinrich's brief previously outlined two separate sets
of facts which provide a basis for defenses tp the claim Wilson
asserts.

See Langheinrich Brief pp. 3-5.

First, L&F and Wilson were both Salt Lake based securities
broker-dealers and over the years had engaged in hundreds of
securities transactions.

When L&F encountered financial
-1-

difficulties partly because its bank withdrew the line of
credit, Langheinrich signed a check as an authorized
representative for L&F, payable to Wilson, in the amount of
$2,764.00.

Later the check failed to clear.

Wilson stopped

payment on two checks made payable to L&F which checks totalled
$11,425.00.
Second, both L&F and Wilson were members of the Pacific
Stock Exchange ("Exchange").

After L&F's financial difficulties

the Exchange sold the seat on the Exchange used by L&F for
$30,000.

Article VII, Section 4 of the Exchange's Constitution

allows members to make claims against the proceeds.

Wilson made

no claim.
The foregoing facts relating to the defenses are
uncontested.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court improperly granted summary judgment to
Wilson because Langheinrich had established issues of fact
pertaining to defenses Langheinrich had properly asserted.
defenses must be considered.

The

The court erred by granting

summary judgment in spite of the defenses raised.

Contrary to

Wilson's claim, the defenses are valid.
Section 7-15-1 making the signor personally liable is
unconstitutional.

The section creates an irrebutable

presumption which is contrary to provable facts. This renders
-2-

the statute violative of due process and is therefore
unconstitutional.
Section 7-15-1 was enacted by the legislation in
contravention of Article 6, Section 22 of th^ Utah Constitution.
The title of the bill did not give fair notice that a signor of
a check was deemed to be liable for the face amount of a check
in that the statute was enacted under a bill pertaining to
financial institutions.

Section 7-15-1 is n<it germane to

financial institutions.

The notice was inadequate under the

Utah Constitution and Utah cases interpreting the relevant
section.
ARGUMENT
I
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN LANGHEINRICH EJLEAD AND
BY AFFIDAVIT RAISED DEFENSES WHICH
ESTABLISHED QUESTIONS OF FACT|.
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that
if there is no genuine issue of material fact, the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The granting of summary judgment is a harsh remedy because
it precludes a party from having his own case heard in court. In
Brandt v. Springville Banking Company, 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d
460 (1960) this court stated:

-3-

We are cognizant of the desirability of permitting
litigants to fully present their case to the court and
that summary judgment prevents this. For this reason
courts are and should be, reluctant to invoke this
remedy.
Also, a granting of summary judgment should be rendered only
after the court has reviewed the record and the evidence and
every inference based on the evidence should be construed in the
light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment
is sought.

Frisbee v. K & K Construction Company, 655 P.2d 391

(Utah 1984), Thompson v. Ford Motor Company, 16 Utah 2d 30, 395
P.2d 62 (1964), Brandt, supra; Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123
Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (1953); Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d
1332.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must
also consider the facts pertaining to any defenses to the
summary judgment.

See Moore Federal Practice (2d ed.) paragraph

56.17 (14) p. 56-735 and Langheinrich's Brief p. 6.
Wilson does not dispute this legal principle.

Instead

Wilson argues that Langheinrich bears the burden of showing a
material fact exists. (Wilson's Brief, pp. 4 and 5.) Wilson
further argues that Section 7-15-1 of the Utah Code applies to
Langheinrich and that the defenses raised lack merit.
Wilson's Brief pp. 6-10*

-4-

See

Wilson's argument that the defenses lack merit is a tacit
admission that summary judgment should not hkve been granted.
When it becomes necessary for a court to consider whether a
defense may be applicable, summary judgment Should not be
-, 1 By granting summary judgment, the lower court
granted.
precluded Langheinrich from presenting and fiilly developing the
facts surrounding Wilson's checks to L&F on Which payment was
stopped and the failure of Wilson to make a cflaim to the
Exchange against the proceeds of the sale of the Exchange seat
of L&F.

Further, the court never made findings and never ruled

on the defenses except to grant Wilson's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The trial court never applied lega|l principles to the

defenses Langheinrich raised.

The defenses a^id the facts

supporting them are issues which remain unresolved and
consequently bar the entry of summary judgment.
Wilson, through its appeal brief, argues ihat the defenses
do not apply.

First, Wilson argues that estoppel was

inapplicable to the present case on the basis that Langheinrich
did not rely to his detriment on any actions 4f Wilson.

In the

context of the estoppel defenses, L&F had issued checks to
Wilson and Wilson later issued checks to L&F.

Subsequently, the

L&F check was not paid and Wilson stopped payment on two checks

The record is void of any countervailing factte to the two sets
of facts which Langheinrich claims constitute defenses to the
summary judgment.
-5-

to L&F for $11,425. (R. 145 and 138)

Presently, Wilson stands

to have the benefit of stopping payment on the checks and
simultaneously collecting on the L&F check from Langheinrich, a
third party.

This is clearly an unconscionable and inequitable

result which frustrates justice.
Under the facts of this case Langheinrich may sustain the
defense of estoppel.

As a starting point, L&F and Wilson had

numerous mutual transactions over time.(R. 136)

Second, Wilson,

through its claim, seeks to make Langheinrich, a third party,
vicariously liable for the obligation of L&F.

Therefore,

Langheinrich has the right to assert any defense against Wilson
that L&F could assert because Langheinrich is forced to stand in
the place of L&F.

At the time the L&F check was written, L&F

had the right to rely that if the check was not paid, Wilson
would not attempt to collect on the L&F check when Wilson had
stopped payment on its checks co L&F.

2

Wilson's course of

conduct provides it with a windfall.
The doctrine of estoppal is premised upon justice and
fairness.

Its primary purpose is to cause equitable results in

Langheinrich may also have an offset against Wilson. If
Langheinrich has the liability of L&F, it is a concomitant that
Langheinrich should also have any claims L&F may have against
Wilson.

-6-

the adminstration of justice.

See Johnson V| Neel 229 P.2d 939

(Colo, 1951) and Scott County, Ark, v. Advance Rumky Thresher
Co. 288 F. 739r at 750 (8th Cir.).
Wilson further argues that its conduct d0es not constitute
waiver.

See Wilson's Brief pp. 8 and 9.

Wilson's argument is

based on the assertion that there was no intentional
relinquishment of Wilson's right under Section 7-15-1 of the
Utah Code.

Wilson's argument attempts to construe the

underlying facts extremely narrowly and to ignore Wilson's
failure to have its claim against L&F satisfied from the
proceeds of the sale of L&F's seat on the Exchange.

Wilson's

argument is faulty.
The fundamental facts are that L&F, the corporation, not
Langheinrich, was the maker and issuer of the check for $2,764;
that Wilson was dealing with L&F? and that Wilson did not expect
payment from Langheinrich.

See Sections 70A3h401 and 403 of the

Utah Code which Sections are part of the Unifbrm Commercial
Code.

Wilson's claim under the check is firs^: against L&F.

Wilson's duty is to conduct itself reasonably and make every
effort to seek compensation from L&F.

Wilson|, as a member of

the Exchange, was on constructive, if not actual, notice of the
provision of the Exchange's Constitution alloying for
intermember claims to be satisfied from the proceeds of the sale

-7-

of a memberfs seat.

(See Section 4 of Article VII.)

Wilson

made no effort to satisfy its claim against L&F under the
provisions of the Exchange Constitution.
Wilson's course of conduct clearly fails within the
definition of waiver.

Wilson has cited the defenition in its

brief at pp. 8 and 9 as:
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right and there must be an existing right, benefit or
advantage, knowledge of its existence, and an intention
to relinquish it and it must be distinctly made,
although it may be expressed or implied. [Citations
omitted.)
Wilson's waiver of its claims by refusing to act can clearly be
implied from the facts Langheinrich presented to the lower
court.

Once Wilson has waived its claim against the primary

obligor, L&F, it may not now assert its claim against
Langheinrich who is allegedly liable vicariously under Section
7-15-1.
Even if the court determines that waiver is not applicable,
Langheinrich has previously raised the defense of Wilson's
failure to mitigate its damages by failing to make a timely
claim to the Exchange.

See Langheinrich Brief, pp. 4 and 8 and

Langheinrich's answer.
If it is assumed that Langheinrich's contention is correct
and that Wilson could have easily satisfied its claim, it is
error for the trial court to grant summary judgment because of
Wilson's failure to mitigate damages.
-8-

Further, if the facts

regarding Wilson's failure to make a claim against the proceeds
from the sale of the Exchange seat are considered in the light
most favorable to Langheinrich, the trial coijirt was in error in
granting summary judgment.

It is black letter law that one who

has a claim against another has a duty to mitigate damages.
II.
SECTION 7-15-1 OF THE UTAH Cd>DE
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECUASE IT CREATES Atjl IRREBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION WHICH IS IRRATIONAL, ARBITRARY OR
UNREASONABLE AND ABRIDGES A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
OF LANGHEINRICH.
Langheinrich has asserted that Section 7-^15-1 of the Utah
Code is unconstitutional becuase it creates dn irrebuttable
presumption which is irrational, arbitrary ai^d unreasonable in
that the assumed facts fail to comport with provable facts.
Section 7-15-1 precludes a signor of checks from making any
defense and causes a signor to be liable regardless of any
attendant circumstances or condition.

In thijs matter,

Langheinrich stands to be deprived of a substantial sum of money
without having an opportunity to set forth any defenses. The
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibit
statutes based on irrebuttable presumptions w^ien the facts may
prove otherwise.

The Fourteenth Amendment in pertinent part

states:
No State shall make or enforce any l^w which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities] of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law . . .

-9-

Wilson argues that Section 7-15-1 is a strict liability
statute and that therefore the cases which Langheinrich cites
regarding irrebuttable presumptions are inapplicable.

Wilson

also argues that the legislature has the prerogative to make an
"issuer" strictly liable.

See Wilson's Brief pp. 10-13.

Statutes creating irrebuttable presumptions and strict
liability are very similar.

Consequently, the cases cited in

Langheinrich1s brief at pp. 11 and 12 are applicable.

It is

unlikely that a strict liability statute would be upheld if
based on a false presumption.
Wilson further argues that this court should not substitute
its judgment for the judgment of the legislature by quoting from
the Bastian v. King 661 P.2d 953 (Utah 1983).
pp. 11 and 12).

(Wilson's Brief

In the instant matter, Langheinrich is not

asking this court to substitute its judgment for the judgment of
the legislature.

Instead Langheinrich has challenged the

constitutionality of the statute because it is based on faulty
presumptions, namely that the signor of the check knows whether
there are funds to cover the check when written and that the
payee on the check expected the signor to be responsible for the
amount of the check.

If provable facts differ from the

irrebuttable presumption, the statute is unconstitutional.

In

Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School District, 507 F. 2d
611 (5th Cir. 1975) at 614, the Court stated:

-10-

The law is clear that due process interdicts the
adoption by a state of an irrebuttable presumption as
to which the presumed fact does not necessarily follow
from the proven facts.
This is applicable to the instant matter.
Wilson also argues that Langheinrich was the issuer of the
check and that therefore he bears the risks 4s an issuer.
(Wilson Brief p. 12)

As previously cited uncjer the Uniform

Commercial Code at Section 70A3-401 and 403f |Mr. Langheinrich
was not the issuer of the check.

He merely s|igned the check

drawn on the account of L&F in a representative capacity and
therefore is not liable as an issuer.

If Wilson hinges its

arguments on Langheinrich being the issuer of the check, that
argument fails because Langheinrich signed th^ check in a
representative capacity. 3
Finally Wilson argues that Langheinrich l^cks standing to
argue that corporate agents should not be personally liable on
checks signed on behalf of the corporation,

^ilson's standing

argument raises the question as to the capacity in which
Langheinrich signed the check.

For the reasons already given,

Langheinrich must be accorded the status of a corporate agent.

3
The capacity in which Langheinrich signed th^ check under
Sections 3-401 and 403 is an issue which the llower court never
addressed nor decided.
-11-

The fact that Langheinrich was also an onficer and director of
the corporation does not affect his status as an age it.

The

unfairness of making a corporate agent liable for the obligation
of the corporation is equally applicable to Mr. Langheinrich as
a "hapless employee who has been unfairly surprised by the
prospect of personal liability for the bad check."

(Wilson's

Brief p. 13). Wilson's argument of the "hapless employee"
virtually concedes the inequity and unfairness of Section
7-15-1.
III.
SECTION 7 - 1 5 - 1

WHEINl ENACTED VIOLATED THE

PROVISIONS OF SECTION 22 OF ARTICLE 6 OF
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Langheinrich contends that under Section 22, Article 6, Utah
Constitution, the enactment of Section 7-15-1 of the Utah Code
is invalid because the title of the bill failed to give adequate
notice to the legislature regarding the full intent and
ramifications of the bill.

Section 22 of Article 6 states:

"No

bill shall be passed containing ,nore than one subject which
shall be clearly expressed in its title."

It is a

constitutional requirement that when enacting statutes, the
legislature has a duty to provide notice to its members of the
subject matter of the legislation.
Wilson argues correctly that the title of the bill enacting
Section 7-15-1 was "Financial Institutions Act of 198x".

Wilson

argues that under McQuire v. University of Utah Mecucal Center
-12-

603 P.2d 786, and Edler v. Edwards 34 Utah 1$, 95 P. 367 (1908),
all that is necessary is to specify the section being amended.
Langheinrich argues that this is not sufficient,

McQuire

requires that the matters enacted be germane to the Title and
that fair notice be given.

Section 7-15-1 w^s amended to make

the signer of a check personally liable and precludes him from
offering any defense related to the signing.

Second, making the

signor of a check liable has little if anything to do with the
financial institutions of the State of Utah.

The signor of the

check is not liable to any financial institution unless the
check is written to that institution.

The only role of the

financial institution is its performance as ^art of the banking
process.

Third, the amendment was a sweeping change from the

former Section 7-15-1 which had a provision requiring that
fraudulent intent be shown on the part of a signor.

For those

reasons, merely stating the Section to be amended is
insufficient.
CONCLUSION
The District Court acted improperly in granting Wilson's
Motion for Summary Judgment when Langheinrich had not only plead
defenses but by affidavit had set forth two sbts of facts which
constitute viable, sustainable defenses to Wilson's claim.
Second, Section 7-15-1 of the Utah Code is unconstitutional
-13-

because it is premised on a presumption that fails to comport
with the provable facts.

Further, Section 7-15-1 was improperly

enacted in that the requirements of Article 6# Section 22 were
not met.
This court should either remand the case to the District
Court after reversing the Order granting summary judgment or, in
the alternative, this court should dismiss plaintiff's Complaint
because it is based on an unconstitutional statute.
Dated this

^h

day of March, 1985.
Respectfully submitted,

tUaJ^JAu, x>*

tj^^u^

Wallace T. Boyack

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant-Defendant, U.S. Mails,
postage prepaid on this

day of March, 1985, to:

Thomas B. Green
Mark E. Wilkey
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR
185 South State, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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1-81

1061

Transfer of Membership

% 1411

Effective Date

SEC 3 Admission to membership shall become effective on the tenth day
following the prescribed posting of said application, unless during the ten-dav posting
period as a result of information submitted concerning the applicant three or more
Governors shall disapprove the application
1)1416

Sign Constitution

Stc 4 No member shall be admitted to the privileges of membership until he
shall have signed the Constitution of the Exehange, and b\ such signature pledge
himself and any member firm he may then or subsequentK represent to abide bv the
Constitution of the Exchange and all rules and regulations adopted pursuant thereto as
the same now exist or may hereafter be amended, revised or supplemented
H 1421

Treasury Membership

SEC 5 An applicant pmchasing a Treasurv membership shall deposit th< pnee
fixed by the Board of Governors for such membership together with the initial Ice
11 1426

No Liability for Using Facilities

S*c 6 The Exchange shall not be liable for any damiges sustained bv a member
or his firm growing out of the us* or emplovment by such member or his firm e)f the
facilities afforded by the Exchange to members in the conduct of their business The
member and his member firm expressh agree in consideration of his admissiem to
membership to release and discharge the Exchange, each of its members, Governors
officers, agents and emplovees of and from all claims or damages arising from the
execution of said Constitution and rules and regulations adopted pursuant therein
ARTICLE VII
TRANSFER OF MEMBERSHIP
11 1451

Transfer

Si-c 1 Membership in the Exchange ma> be transferred bv a member onlv in
aeeordance with the provisions of this Article VII and onlv to a person whose
application and election becomes etlee live under Artiele \ I
I 1456

Fees

Sf-c 2 An application for transfer of membership shall be accompanied bv such
fees as shall be dete rmmed bv the Roan I ot Governors
II 1461

Settlement of Contracts

Si e 3(a) The member pioposmg to transfer his membership shall not after
settlement date fixed by tin Boaul ot Governors make any comiacts on the Exchange
except contracts expressly mule on be lulf of another member of the Fxehange
1)1466

Contracts Mature

Sic 3(b) On the settlement date all member contracts of the member pioposmg
to make such transfer, or of his turn shall mature and if not settled shall be closed out
as in the case of insolvency unless the same are assumed or taken over bv another
member of the Exe hangc
H 1471

Payment Purchase Price

SLC 4 At least four davs prior to the effective date 6f admission to membership
of the transferee, any purchase price being paid for such transfer shall be paid to the
Exchange The only claim of the transferor to such purchase price shall be to any
Pacific Stock Exchange Guide
019

I

Article

VII

111471

I

CONST I ~i u

T/UA/

1062

1M

Constitution

^\

surplus remaining after the application of such purchase price to the following
purposes and in the following order ot priority.
(a) The full payment of all dues, icts, charges, fines and contributions
assessable against said membership or payable by the transferor or his member
firm to the Exchange and to the Pacific Clearing Corporation
(b) The payment to members or member firms of all filed claims arising from
member contracts if and to the extent that the same shall be determined by the
Board of Governors to have arisen out of contracts had between the parties
thereto in the ordinary course ot business and shall not have been disallowed by
the Board of Governors
(c) The payment of all member contracts that are made subject to the rules
of another exchange, provided that such claim shall have been allowed hv the
Board of Governors
% 1476

Claim Unascertained

SF.C. 5. If a claim based on a contract is unascertained, the Board of Governors
may reserve and retain out of the pun hase price such an amount as it may deem
appropriate pending the determination of the amount due on such claim A claim shall
be allowed by the Board of Governors only for the amount due thereon after crediting
the fair value of any collateral securing such claim. If the purchase price is insufficient
to pay all of the claims arising out of contracts allowed by the Board of Governors, sud
claims shall be paid pro rata The surplus, if any, of the purchase price shall be paid to
the transferor, or his h gal repiesentanve, upon the execution of releases satisfactory to
the Board of Governors.
111481

File Statement

S Kr^Jju-A • ixiembiX-M mem her hrm shall forfeit any elaim_ under Sec 4 of (his
ATucIe^VIX to share injhe purcTfase p r u ^ ^ t T n ^ ^ O T j e s s a stafemenXoT^UTh rtrnrn
7s"filed with the Exchange prtofT^
of the transfer. If sucfl statement
of claim is not so filed, the claim may still be" allowed by "the Hoard of Governors and
paid out of any surplus after all other claims allowed by the Board of Governors have
been paid in full, and may be paid in preference to claims referred to in Sec 7 uf this
Article VII.
11 1486

Claim Between Member, His Partners, Etc.

SKC. 7. Claims arising out of transactions between the member and his partners,
or associated stockholders, who are members of the Exchange, shall not share in the
purchase price until after all other claims, as allowed by the Board of Governors, have
been paid in full.
H 1491

Deceased Member Whose Membership Purchased With Firm's Funds

SEC. 8(a). Upon the death of a member whose membership was purchased from
funds advanced by his member firm, such membership shall be transferred to a
surviving allied member of such member firm, or to an officer and director of >uch
member firm under the provisions of Sec. 1(f) of Article VIII, or a quahiied nominee
under the provisions of Sec. 2(a) of Article VIII, provided in any case such transferee is
elected to membership under Article VI. The Board of Governors may require as a
condition of transfer payment to the Exchange of funds sufficient to pay priority
claims as set forth in Sec 4 of this Article VII.
1 1501

Membership Not Purchased With Firm's Funds

SKC. 8(b). Upon the death of a member whose membership was purchased
otherwise than by funds advanced by his member firm, such membership shall be
transferred in accordantt with any agreement between such deceased member and his
member firm, provided such agreement had previously been filed with the Exchange
1f 1471

Article

VII

<ol981, Commerce Clearing House, in_

[27]

BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Ch. 16

(1) Each lender requiring the establishment or continuance of a reserve
account in connection with an existing or future real estate loan shall pay
interest on funds deposited in the account [af^er June 30, 1979] of at least
[4%) 5 1/4% simple interest per annum, unless:
(a) The reserve account is required by a governmental insurer or guarantor of the loan as a condition of insurance or guaranty;
(b) The reserve account is maintained in connection with a real estate loan
in an original principal amount exceeding 80% M the lender's appraised value
of the property at the time the loan is made provided that when the principal
balance of the loan is paid down to 80% this exception shall not apply; or
(c) The payment of interest or other compensation to the borrower for the
use of funds deposited in a reserve account is| prohibited by federal law or
regulations.
(2) The interest shall be computed as of the end of the calendar year on
the average of the month end balances in the account for that calendar year
or partial calendar year, except that in the event of payoff of the real estate
loan, interest shall be computed on the average month end balances in the
account for the partial year ending at the end of the month preceding payoff.
The interest shall, within 60 days after the end of each calendar year, at the
election of the lender, be credited to the remaining principal balance on the
loan, paid to the borrower, his successors or assigns, or credited to the
reserve account, except that in the event of payoff of the real estate loan, the
interest shall be paid or credited to the borrower, his successors or assigns
within 30 days after the date of payoff.
(3) No lender shall require or impose a service charge for the administration of a reserve account.
(4) Except as provided in this section, no lender shall be obligated to
pay interest on or account for the earnings from funds in any reserve account
in connection with the real estate loan made or held after June 30, 1979,
unless an agreement in writing expressly so providing was executed by the
borrower and lender.
Approved March 23, 1981.

CHAPTER 16
S B No 134

(Passed Marcjh 12. 1981

In effect July 1. 1981 )

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT OF 1981
AN ACT RELATING TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CLARIFYING SUPERVISORY
POWERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS; SUBJECTING PREVIOUSLY UNREGULATED FINANCIAL SERVICES TO SUPERVISION AND REGULATION BY THE DEPARTMENT; LIMITING THE JURISDICTION OF THE DEPARTMENT
TO PREVENT OVERLAPPING AND DUPLICATING REGULATION; GRANTING STATE
CHARTERED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THE SAME OPERATING POWERS AS CONGRESS HAS GRANTED FEDERALLY CHARTERED INSTITUTIONS; PROVIDING FOR
RECIPROCITY WITH REGARD TO THE ENTRY QF FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, SUBJECT TO A SHOWING OF PUBLIC NEtED REPEALING CERTAIN CHAP-

Ch. 16

BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

[28]

TERS OF TITLE 7 R U T FORMERLY GOVERNED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND
PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.
THIS ACT REPEALS CHAPTERS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 8a, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, AND 18 OF TITLE
7, AND SECTION 78-12-34, LTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AND ENACTS CHAPTERS
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 8a, 9, 11, 14, AND 15 OF TITLE 7, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah
Section 1. Chapters repealed.
Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 8a, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, and 18 of Titk 7, and
Section 78-12-34, Utah Code Annotated 1953, are repealed
Section 2. Chapter enacted.
Chapter 1 of Title 7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to reaj
ARTICLE 1
7-1-101. Citation of act.
This act shall be known and mav be cited as the ''Financial Institutions
Act of 1981/'
7-1-102. Legislative findings and intent—Purposes of act.
The legislature finds that it is in the public interest to strengthen the regulation, supervision, and examination of persons, firms, corporations, associations, and other business entities furnishing financial services to the people of
this state or owning and controlling those businesses The legislature further
finds that there have been substantial changes in the structure of the f nancial
services industry and the nature and characteristics of the institutions and
other business entities furnishing those services Accordingly, it is the purpose
of this act to expand and strengthen the duties, powers, and responsibilities of
the state department of financial institutions and to place under its jurisdiction all classes of institutions and other businesses engaged in furnishing
financial services to the people of this state or owning and controlling those
businesses The legislature further finds that there has been a trend toward
the expansion of the powers and functions of federally chartered or insured
financial institutions to the competitive disadvantage of institutions chartered
under the laws of this state Accordingly, it is the further purpose of this act
to grant powers, privileges, and immunities to state chartered institutions at
least equal to those possessed b> federallv chartered or insured institutions of
the same class furnishing financial services to the people of this state in order
to promote competitive equality in the financial services industry in this state
and to protect the interests of shareholders, members, depositors, and other
customers of state chartered institutions
The legislature further finds that the commissioner of financial institutions,
under section 5 oi chapter 4, Laws of Utah 1980, has recommended in order
to protect the depositors, customers, and shareholders of depository institution^ having their principal place of business in this state and in the interest of
the general public and the economy of this state, that the state department of
financial institutions be empowered to regulate the establishment in this state
of offices of foreign depository institutions as defined in that legislation and

